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an Ohio decision holding that the term "heirs" as used in a deed to
describe the remaindermen, included an adopted child of the life
tenant' It was presumed in that case that the grantor intended the
words in the deed should have their ordinary meaning, nd that to
exclude an adopted child the grantor would have to do so expressly.
The Kentucky court said that the Ohio statute on adoption"' was much
broader than the Kentucky provision and that the cases were dis-
tinguishable. It is submitted that the Statute in Kentucky is suffi-
ciently broad to include an adopted child in a deed where the remain-
dermen are described as "her heirs". It must be admitted that the
adopted child is an heir of the foster parent. Suppose A conveys
land to B, a stranger, for his life and at B's death to B's heirs. B has
an adopted child, his only heir-at-law, who claims the land. The
Kentucky court could scarcely hold that the adopted child did not
take the land, because by the statutory provisions Of this 'Common-
wealth the adopted child is the heir of the fosterparent. Should it
make any difference if A is the adopted child's foster father's parent?
It seems difficult to frame language more direct and expressive than
that used in the Kentucky Statute showing the intention to place an
adopted child upon an absolute equality with natural children. Cer-
tainly the grantor, in the principal case, should be presumed to know
that it was possible for the life tenant to adopt a child and that such
child would be an heir of the life tenant. It is submitted that the
fictitious intent of the grantor should not be allowed to overrule the
ordinary interpretation of the words of the deed.
When the court supplied words limiting succession to the
daughter's heirs-at-law, who should be of her blood, it amended
rather than construed the deed. The word "heirs" has an ascer-
tained meaning, and here scarcely requires interpretation. There
being nothing in other portions of the deed to indicate that the word
"heirs" was not used in its ordinary sense, the court departed from
,that primarily meaning of the term for the purpose of giving effect
to what it guessed was the intention of the grantor, feeling perhaps
that such a departure constituted a fairer distribution of the prop-
erty. The grantor should have expressly limited the remaindermen
to heirs of the daughter's blood if he intended this result.
j. GRANILLE CLARK
CAN A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY WHO IS NOT A PAYEE
ENFORCE A CONTRACT FOR HIS BENEFIT?
In contemplation of divorce, H, the husband, made a valid con-
tract with W, his wife, providing that he would pay her a certain
sum monthly for the support and maintenance of their children
23 Laws v. Davis, 34 Ohio App. 157, 170 N. E. 601 (1930).
"I. . the adopted child shall stand in the same relation for
all purposes to such declarant as he or she would be in if they were
a child born in lawful wedlock . . .", as cited in Laws v. Davis,
supra note 13.
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until they should reach their majority. The divorce was obtained
and G, the guardian of the children, sues to enforce the back pay-
ments due under the contract. The majority of the court said that
only W could sue on the contract since she was both promisee and
payee. Since the children were neither, they were incidental bene-
ficiaries only and could not enforce a contract for their benefit. The
dissenting opinion agreed that the plaintiff could not recover as a
third party beneficiary, but argued that there could be a recovery
on the ground that the contract created a trust obligation against H
and in favor of W for the benefit of the children and that a suit could
be brought by the guardian against H, joining W, to enforce this
trust.2
In only one case have I been able to find and support for the
holding that the mother and not the child is the only one who can
enfore the contract and there it is in the form of dictum. Williston
says, however, that everywhere a child is able to enforce a contract
between the father and mother for his support and maintenance, and
usually as a third party beneficiary.' Certainly the child is a credi-
tor beneficiary rather than a donee beneficiary due to the father's
continuing duty to support him, regardless of the contract. This
should enable the child to sue on the contract in his own name.
In Brill v. BriWV the father of a bastard agreed to pay the mother
certain sums at stated intervals for the support and maintenance of
the child. It was held that the child could enforce the contract
against the promisor and that the mother could not release its interest.
The reason given for the holding was that, ". . . the primary and
main benefit is for Edward, the third party involved."' Also in Wein-
berger v. Van Hessen7 the infant was allowed to enforce a stranger's
contract with its mother to support the child for life. By analogy
Kentucky seems to permit the infant to enforce the contract against
the promisor in such a case. In Wickliffe's Ex'rs. v. Smith 8 the evi-
dence showed that the defandant had agreed to pay a certain sum to
a bank to the order of the promisee, a citizens' committee, for the
purpose of building a certain road in that county. In deciding that
case the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the county was a
Percival v. Luce, 114 F. (2d) 774, 775 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
'Percival v. Luce, 114 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
'Franklin v. Ford, 13 Ga. App. 469, 79 S. E. 366, 367 (1913)
(Dictum).
12 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 356.
S282 Pa. 276, 127 Atl. 840 (1925).
'Id. at 842. (In the later case of Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543, 147
Atl. 608, 610 (1929) the court said that the reason for the enforcement
of the Brill contract was public policy, but in the Brill case itself
there is no mention of public policy as such.)
7 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E. 429 (1932). (Though the infant would
become payee upon reaching his majority, he could not sue until
then. Therefore, for the payments prior to his attaining his majority
the situation would be analogous to that in the Luce case.).8225 Ky. 796, 10 S. W. (2d) 291 (1928).
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proper party plaintiff in the committee's action against the promisor,
although the county was neither promisee nor payee and there was
nothing to show that the committee was its servant or agent. In an
analogous situation the beneficiary was allowed to enforce a contract
between others to pay his debt to a fourth party, even though he was
not a payee.0
Not only is the weight of authority contra to the principal case,
but it is submitted that it is illogical also, if we are to support the
American rule respecting obligee beneficiaries. It is admitted that
the plaintiff can not recover if he is an incidental beneficiary" and it
is also admitted that there can be a recovery if he is a direct and not
an incidental beneficiary. Therefore, it is hard to follow the court's
reasoning in denying relief to the children as incidental beneficiaries
in the light of its statement that:
"It is true that the money which the defendant promised to
pay Dorothy Lehman was to be used by her for the support and
maintenance of the minors. It is also true that if the money had
been so used, such use would have benefitted the minors."'-
Despite this admission the court assumed that the children were only
indirect and incidental beneficiaries, since they were neither promi-
sees nor payees. But who else will benefit from the contract? The
promisee will not, since she must use the money for the support and
maintenance of the children as promided by the contract, and her
admission of this fact is shown by the appointment of a guardian to
bring the action, when she might perhaps have sued as promisee.-
The question who is the direct beneficiary is determined by the inten-
tion of the parties."' The contract itself, ' and a reasonable interpre-
tation of the evidence, show that the children were intended to be the
direct beneficiaries.
That the children were direct beneficiaries is shown conclusively
by ascertaining the nature of an incidental beneficiary. A definition
which is taken from a Kentucky case says: ". . . such person is an
incidental beneficiary if the benefits to him are merely incidental to
the performance of the promise and if he is neither a donee bene-
ficiary nor a creditor beneficiary."" Suppose B contracts with A to
'Tasin v. Bastress, 284 Pa. 47, 130 Atl. 417 (1925). (Here the
money was to be paid to the creditor by the promisor and not to the
beneficiary.)
"National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1878; Percival
v. Luce, 114 F. (2d) 774, 775 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) (Dictum); Spur-
rier et al. v. Burnett et al., 207 Ky. 736, 270 S. W. 25 (1925).
'Percival v. Luce, supra n. 10.
' Croker v. New York Trust Co., 245 N. Y. 17, 156 N. E. 81 (1927);
2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) secs. 390, 392.
" Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. National Surety Co., 234 Ky.
764, 768, 29 S. W. (2d) 29, 31 (1930) (Dictum); Banker v. Breaux,
133 Tex. 183, 128 S. W. (2d) 23 (1939).
"Supra n. 1.
Hendrix Mill & Lumber Co. et al. v. Meador et al., 228 Ky. 844,
848, 16 S. W. (2d) 482, 483 (1929); see supra n. 4.
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erect an expensive building on A's land. C's adjoining land would
be enhanced in value by the performance of the contract, but he can
not enforce the contract, since it was not made for his benefit."
Another example of an incidental beneficiary occurred in a case
where A promised to pay B's expenses on a certain expedition. The
latter's creditors could not sue on the contract, for there was no intent
to benefit them, and they were only incidental beneficiaries? 7 In a
case where an abstracter of title for a vendor was negligent, he was
not liable to the vendee for the resulting damage. The latter was not
intended to be benefitted by the contract between the vendor and the
abstracter.' In the Luce case the children were specifically men-
tioned in the contract and evidently occupied such an important posi-
tion in the contemplation of the parties that it is impossible to agree
with the court's assertion that they are only incidental beneficiaries.
The courts that have considered the situation in the principal
case, and yet have not permitted a recovery by the children as third
party beneficiaries, often struggle to avoid a harsh result by permit-
ting a recovery as a result of what seems to be strained reasoning.1 '
Possibly one way to permit the plaintiff to recover in these jurisdic-
tions is on the ground that a trust was created for the benefit of the
children, with the promisee as trustee of the promise.
We must examine the contract of the principal case, as well as
the circumstances surrounding it, to ascertain whether a trust was
created. The contract provides,
"Second: For the support and maintenance of the aforesaid
children the party of the first part shall pay to the party of the
second part the sum of $25.00 per month for each of said chil-
dren, the payment of said sum of $25.00 per month to discontinue
as each child attains the age of majority."' "
"Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 133.
112 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 402.
' Shine v. Nash Abstract & Investment Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So.
47 (1928). For additional cases on this point see footnote 9 in 2
Williston, supra n. 8. Also the creditor mentioned in n. 9, supra, is an
incidental beneficiary according to 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.
1936) sec. 356.
' Another reason to permit the children to recover as third party
beneficiaries is the "Close Relationship Doctrine" which has consider-
able support in the United States, acccording to Clarke v. McFarland's
Ex'rs., 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 45, 48 (1837) (Argument); supra n. 7 at page
430; 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 357; Note (1926) 24
Michigan Law Review 414. Williston says that this view allows the
child to recover from the promisor on the ground that his legal per-
sonality merges with that of the promisee's, his mother, due to their
close relationship, so as to allow him to sue on the grounds that he
has become promisee. However, Williston criticizes this doctrine as
a crude fiction.
"Supra n. 1.
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The following example will best explain how the trust theory is
applied under these circumstances. The first real example of this
type of trust occurred in the case of Tomlinson v. Gill, 2 where A
promised B that if she would consent to his being appointed adminis-
trator of her deceased husband's estate, he would pay the latter's
debts to the extent that they were not paid by the estate. A creditor
enforced this agreement against A on the ground that a trust was
created for his benefit with B as trustee. This could not be a trust,
for a trustee must act so as to manifest an intention to act as trustee.=
Here there is nothing to indicate that B realized that she was a trus-
tee or intended to act as one. Therefore, this is a typical third party
beneficiary case and a recovery would be allowed in the United States
on that groundr In another case A advanced money to M at a cer-
tain rate of interest to be paid to her for life. Upon A's death M was
to hold it for the use of B and pay it over at a certain time to B. It
was held that M was trustee for A during her life and for B after-
wards. ' It is submitted that this case was incorrectly decided.
Since M paid interest, he had the use of the money and was under
only a personal obligation to repay the money as a debt." Therefore,
there could be no trust there, for a promisor can not be trustee of his
own debt.' In another case a father made a sealed contract with
promisees to the effect that his executors would pay £60,000 to them
in trust for his illegitimate sons. The latter were able to enforce this
agreement on the ground that a trust was created for their benefit.
This was probably not a trust, for the so-called trustees here would
make themselves liable to the beneficiaries by not suing. This showed
that they did not realize that there was a trust. For there to be a
trust the trustee must realize that there is a trust and manifest an
intention to act as trustee.'
It is submitted that this class of cases is wrong in holding that a
trust arises. The words are words of promise and not of trust."
-1 Amb. 330 (Ch. 1756), 27 Eng. Reprint 221. Contra: West v.
Houghton, L. R. 4 C. P. 197 (1879).
'1 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14.2 and sec. 24.
"Steele v. Clarke, 77 Ill. 471 (1875); Restatement, Trusts (1935)
sec. 14.
Moore v. Darton, 4 DeG. & Sm. 517 (V. C. 1851), 64 English
Reprint 938. Contra: In re Caplan's Estate. Bulbreck v. Sylvester,
45 L. J. Ch. 280 (1876). It probably overrules Moore v. Darton,
though it does not specifically mention it. Also Richard v. Delbridge,
L. R. 18 Eq. 11 (1874) overruled a somewhat similar case, Morgan v.
Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. 475 (1870).
11 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14.4; 2 Williston, Con-
tracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 360; Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 14.
"Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 14.
"Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67 (V. C. 1844), 67 English
Reprints 564. Contra: Colyear v. Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81 (Rolls Court
1836), 48 English Reprint 559.
Supra n. 25.
"Corbin, Anson on Contracts (Fifth Ed. 1930) sec. 285, foot-
note 4.
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Usually no trust was mentioned or contemplated.V ' The reason for
such strained reasoning is that in England a party can not recover on
a contract made for his benefit if he is not a party to the contract, and
the courts frequently torture such cases into trusts to avoid a harsh
result.' The admission of these facts by the English Courts is indi-
cated by the fact that later cases renounce the trust theory."
The test whether there is a trust or a third party beneficiary
contract would seem to be whether the payee is to collect the money
under a duty as trustee and pay the proceeds to a third person, while
performing all the other duties of a trustee; or whether the third
person can collect the money.' The other duties of a trustee would
be to keep the trust money separate from his own"' and care for it for
the benefit of the beneficiary.' This would not make the bene-
ficiaries in circumstances similar to the Luce case cestuis of a trust,
as it might seem at first glance, for the parent or guardian acts for
them in collecting the money and any action brought is treated as
that of the child.
It is submitted that the Luce case is wrong and conflicts more-
over with the weight of authority. This is an ordinary case of a
third party beneficiary which is sometimes confused with a trust.
E. R. WEBB
THE BREACH OF A PENAL STATUTE WHICH HAS FOR ITS
PURPOSE THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS
EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
A recent California case' raises a matter which has caused a
great deal of disagreement and uncertainty among the different
courts in the field of Torts. Plaintiff was driving her car and
attempted to make a left turn. Defendant's street car approached
at a speed in excess of the maximum speed provided for by statute
and collided with the car. The opinion in deciding for the plain-
tiff said:
"If the jury believed that the defendant, Sherman was
traveling at a rate of speed in excess of 15 miles an hour,-and
according to his own testimony he was so traveling-the
defendant's negligence was established. The violation of an
ordinance or statute is negligence per se."
" Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1930) 46
Law Quarterly Review 12, 17; Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 1271, 1272.
1 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14.4.
"Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation (P. C.
1933) A. C. 70, 77; In re Rotherham Alum and Chemical Co., 25 Ch.
Div. 103, 111 (1883); In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 125,
127 (1880); West v. Houghton, L. R. 4 C. P. 197 (1879). Colyear v.
Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81 (Rolls Court 1836), 48 English Report 559; 2
Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 360.
"1 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14.2.
"Ibid.
"Ibid. and sec. 14.
'93 Pac. (2) 135 (1939).
K. L. J.-9
